In last week's blog I
discussed the importance of politics when it comes to accessibility to (fresh) water. Looking at physical availability of water only, does not represent the
actual availability and accessibility of water in Africa. Actors such as governments,
NGO's and local officials all play a big role in the accessibility of water for
African citizens. In today's blog I am going to have a look at one of Africa's
biggest and most ambitious electricity projects in recent history: the
construction of the Renaissance Dam in Ethiopia. And more important, what are
the political consequences of this construction for relations between Ethiopia and Egypt and Sudan?
Ethiopia started the
construction of the Grand Renaissance Dam (see figure 1) in 2011 on the
Blue Nile at the height of Guba, about 45 km from the Sudanese border (Tesfa, 2013). Ethiopia, after the Democratic Republic of Congo, has the highest
theoretical hydropower capacity in Africa. However, only tiny amounts of this
capacity have been used. Considering only 23% of Ethiopian households have
access to electricity and 96% are still relying on traditional biomass, there is a need for more electricity (T.N. Kahsay et al., 2015). The Grand Renaissance
Dam costs $ 4.8 billion and will have an installed capacity of 5250 megawatts.
When the dam is finished, it will have a reservoir volume of more than 63
billion cubic meters, approximately 1.3 times the annual flow amount of the
Blue Nile (Hammond, 2013; Veilleux, J., 2013; Chen, H. & Swain, A., 2014).
Figure 1: The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam under construction in 2017.
Ethiopia is struggling with
shortage of water storage facilities, demands of institutional and
infrastructural investment is high but the investment ability is low. A study
of the Worldbank proves that the cost of hydrological variability has currently
been estimated on more than one third of the country’s annual GDP. Therefore
Ethiopia should really consider investing in multipurpose water infrastructure
to ensure a sustainable long term solution for droughts and floods. Despite
this need of a multipurpose water system, Ethiopia is only focusing on power
generation instead of for example irrigation and water storage (Hammond, 2013; Chen, H., & Swain, A. 2014).
Fighting over Nile waters
The Nile river, on which
the Grand Renaissance is built, is home to 11 African countries: Burundi,
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya,
Rwanda, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda. Adjustments in the river
automatically affect (mainly downstream) countries. Considering the Nile
countries face increasing pressure on water resources due to population- and
economic growth, tensions between Ethiopia and in particular Egypt and Sudan
regarding the Grand Renaissance Dam, have increased (Hammond, 2013).
The Ethiopian highlands
provide around 86% of the total Nile flow, 70% of that flow is coming from the
Blue Nile (Hammond, 2013). Because the Nile river is so precious to North
Eastern African countries, the water distribution of the river is laid out in
the Nile agreement of 1959 between the riparian states of Egypt and Sudan. This
agreement allocates 55.5 km3 to Egypt and 18.5 km3 to Sudan. Ethiopia
(among other countries), however, has never acknowledged this agreement and
argues that since most of the river flow originates in Ethiopia it has the
right to have an equal and appropriate share of the river flow. Attempts on
changing the 1959 agreement have failed in both 1999 and 2010. Egypt and Sudan
showed great opposition and wished to keep their veto rights over upstream
developments.
According to Ethiopia the
agreement between Sudan and Egypt is only a bilateral one, excluding other
riparian countries. Egypt needs the water and believes that it has the
historical right of the Nile waters. This need for water is confirmed by Taylor
(2017), arguing Egypt is in water stress according to the latest statistics. Egyptian
former president Mohamed Morsi reportedly said in a television interview in
2013 he was not calling for a war with Ethiopia, but Egypt’s water security
should not be ‘violated at all’. He warned Ethiopia by saying that if the
Egyptian share of water was to diminished by one drop, ‘our blood is the
alternative’ (CNN, 2018). This
opposition reflects the change in geopolitical powers in the region. Egypt’s
position as a hegemonic regional power due to a significant discrepancy between
the socio-economic development with upstream states is decreasing. Ethiopia as
a rising economic power and home to 86% of the Nile’s water supply will challenge
Egypt’s power more and more (Hammond, 2013).
In the past decades
Ethiopia has failed to exploit their water potentials due to financial and
political problems. Besides that, fellow riparian state Egypt has repeatedly
succeeded in preventing international creditors and donors from investing in
Ethiopian's Grand Renaissance Dam (Hammond, 2013; Veilleux, 2013; Chen, H., & Swain, A. 2014).
Thus, the
construction of The Grand Renaissance Dam has caused great concerns in Egypt
and Sudan. The Ethiopian government, however, argues that both countries will
not be (significantly) harmed by the construction and operation of the dam. The
government argues that Eastern Nile countries will even benefit from it.
According to a research from Kahsay et al. (2015) Egypt will only be harmed by
the dam if a sequence of dry years occur, that is because Egypt is more
dependent on energy than water for it’s economic prosperity. Overall Kahsey et
al (2015) argue that the building of the dam will boost the economy of Eastern
African countries is therefore valuable for the riparian states.
As we have
seen in this blog, water and constructions that change the flow of water are
contested in a regional manner. Accessibility is not just a local affaire, it’s
dependent on the actions of other (government) actors as well. As all riparian
Nile countries are to some extent dependent on the Nile’s water, intervention
on the river is a highly sensitive topic, just because it affects a basic need
of life.
Bibliography
Chen, H., &
Swain, A. (2014). The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam: Evaluating its
sustainability standard and geopolitical significance. Energy
Development Frontier, 3(1), 11.
Hammond, M.
(2013, February). The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam and the Blue Nile:
implications for transboundary water governance. In Global Water Forum (Vol.
1307).
Kahsay, T. N., Kuik, O., Brouwer, R., & van der Zaag, P. (2015). Estimation of the transboundary economic
impacts of the Grand Ethiopia Renaissance Dam: A computable general equilibrium
analysis. Water Resources and Economics, 10, 14-30.
Lazarus, S.
(2018, October 21). Is Ethiopia taking control of the Nile river?. CNN. Retrieved from
https://edition.cnn.com/2018/10/19/africa/ethiopia-new-dam-threatens-egypts-water/index.html
Tesfa, B.
(2013). Benefit of grand Ethiopian renaissance dam project (GERDP) for Sudan
and Egypt.
Veilleux, J. C.
(2013). The human security dimensions of dam development: the grand Ethiopian
renaissance dam. Global Dialogue, 15(2), 1-15.
Great summary of the current tensions in Egypt, Ethiopia and partially Sudan as a result of the Grand Renaissance Dam. You mentioned that 'Ethiopia should really consider investing in multipurpose water infrastructure to ensure a sustainable long term solution for droughts and floods'. Do have any suggestions on what could be used and why are they more sustainable in the long term than the Grand Renaissance Dam? how have political objectives and potentially power imbalances caused Ethopia's to focus on power generation?
ReplyDeleteDear Marie,
ReplyDeleteGreat questions. To start with, I would like to explain why the GERD might not be a sustainable solution in the long run. Although there are some studies that show the expansion of hydropower capacity would be beneficial, there are some uncertainties concerning its long term benefits. First of all the Nile river has a high variability, which is likely to get worse due to climate change. Recently a study has shown a decrease in the runoff of the Blue Nile. Besides that, Ethiopia is highly dependent on hydropower to provided their citizens with energy, reliance on the GERD might therefore be risky.
Another problem Ethiopia is facing is their inability to store water in so called water storage facilities. Therefore they are described as ‘hostages of hydrology’. A study by the World Bank estimates Ethiopians cost on hydrological variability at over a third of its GDP. According to the World Bank investing in multipurpose water infrastructure would make Ethiopia more water-resilient and lead to long term economic growth rather than only focusing on energy which is the case with the GERD. The dam is focused primarily on electricity generation and therefore might not present an optimal investment choice. Alternatively to the GERD Ethiopia should focus on multipurpose infrastructure including for example hydropower production facilities, irrigation systems and storage capacities that could mitigate the impact of both floods and droughts.
Your last question is a hard one I must say and I am not sure whether I am able to answer it correctly. Considering power imbalances and political objectives I feel like the Ethiopian government uses the GERD as a project of nationalism, trying to unify the Ethiopian population. As I have read in academic papers and interviews, almost all Ethiopians feel the GERD is a major and important project for Ethiopian development. It’s a project of prestige and gives the country more power with respect to Egypt, Sudan and the rest of the Nile’s riparian states. What I have learned in some of the lectures and seminars is that access to electricity is often more important to people than access than clean water. They take their struggle with water for granted whereas electricity is new and exciting. The Ethiopian tries to justify this by emphasising the country’s high population growth which would legitimise Ethiopia’s need for more energy and therefore the construction of the GERD. In sum the Ethiopian government uses the GERD as a way to mobilise the Ethiopian population and unify them because almost everyone is in favour of the dam. The government closes their eyes for issues concerning water although they could have built a multipurpose infrastructural construction as well. The World Bank therefore doesn’t grant Ethiopia with loans for the GERD because they see the project as unsustainable in the long term.
Thomas Hokkelman