What I have learned about this blog

The past couple of months I have learned a lot about the political dimension of water and development in Africa and in specific in Angola, Botswana, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Sudan, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. I started this blog with a biased view on water and its distribution and amount over the continent. I thought Africa was more than anything, a dry, unfertile continent. A continent plagued by droughts, famine and deserts. How can a country develop and flourish, not only economically but also politically and socially without having any water, was my thought? Of course this view of mine was too simplistic, I knew it was but I did not know the other side of the story. As a Dutch man, living in one of the wealthiest countries in the world, with access to great water resources, the struggle for water in Africa seemed far away. My view was influenced by media, addressing Africa as one country, always using its name in the same sentence with aids, poverty, conflict, corruption and definitely water scarcity. Thus, as a child growing up in a Western country my view of Africa was Eurocentric and biased from the beginning, even when I started taking this course.

I was immediately confronted with my biased views in the first lecture that introduced the course. My ideas of distribution, accessibility and volume of water in Africa was completely wrong. Furthermore I learned access to water had more to do with politics rather than volume or variability of precipitation. My first blog can therefore best be described as my revelation of water and politics. Specifically this relation is what grabbed my attention most. In the beginning of blogging I struggled with finding topics to write about. Politics is everywhere, where do I start? An article about Ethiopian’s Grand Renaissance Dam got me interested in what is called shared water resources management (SWRM). This comprises all water resources that are shared between different kinds of actors that all have an interest in the water resource. I found out that in a lot of cases water resources cover territories in different countries. Because water bodies are not limited to one specific territory but shared between different groups, and interests, conflict is likely to arise. Different groups have different interests and should therefore cooperate in fulfilling everyone’s needs. However power relations between the different interest groups are asymmetric. Some actors have more power than others, for instance national government have more power than small marginalised local groups and upstream riparian states often have more power than their downstream counterparts. These different power relations are key to understanding why some people have access to water and why some don’t. 

In my blogs I tried to involve as many interest groups as possible and tried to unveil the different power relations between actors in specific cases. I have discussed SWRM among the Nile riparian states, the Zambezi riparian states and the countries that are using the Nubian Sandstone Aquifer. I have also touched upon  topics that are less place specific but happen all over Africa such as water grabbing. And finally I have discussed global actors in the case of the Akosombo dam in Ghana.

So what are my main findings after writing these blogs? First of all, the (extreme) asymmetry in power between different interest groups. Often, the national (or global) actor has a dominance over the local and region interests. National governments make decisions without paying any attention to local interest and often even exclude local groups in their decision-making. They do this under the guise of national interest and development rather than local decline. Furthermore have found out that making decisions about water management is not as simple is one might think. Data is often manipulated or faked due to a lack of adequate instruments to measure water quality, volume and variability. Therefore making wrong decisions is frequent. A third finding is the vitality of water for human kind. The reason why conflicts over water are happening is because of its great value. We must never underestimate the importance of water for humankind and its survival. Conflicts about water are serious and must be solved including all interest groups that are involved. I will never forget what the Egyptian president said about the construction of the GERD and its possible threat to Egypt’s water security: We would go over war for our water resources. This statement made me realise how serious water affairs are. I can’t blame Egypt for defending itself in survival. In the end we all need it to survive.

My final remark on this blog is that I feel more aware of the importance of water and the privileged position I find myself in, having access to sufficient and good quality water. I hope the world will shift into a world with equal water access in which we can all flourish and don’t have to suffer from the consequence of a lack of fresh water.

The Zambezi river basin: a regional lifeline

One of the main topics I discuss in my blogs in the management of transboundary water resources between the states that use these resources. I have discussed the Grande Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, involving Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan and I have addressed the transboundary water conflict between the riparian states of the Nubian Sandstone Aquifer in North East-Africa. I have realised my main focus has been on the Nile countries when it comes to transboundary water resource management (or an absence of this management). Therefore, thig blog will shift my focus on the Nile area to the southern part of Africa: the Zambezi River Basin. In this blog I will talk about the management of this important river basin between its riparian states.

As I have mentioned, the Zambezi River is located in Southern-Africa flowing through 8 different basin states: Angola, Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe (see figure 1). Out of these countries Zambia, Angola, Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Malawi. These eight states are members of the economic grouping called the Southern African Development Community (SADC). have the largest share of its basin (Heyns, 2003; Osborne,2000; Tumbare, 2015). The river supports over 20 million people and is expected to increase to over 70 million people by 2050. As we have seen before in the Nile countries, these population growths will increase water demands for food and energy which can negatively impact the basin’s ecosystem and environment. The river basin has experienced infrastructural development for energy generation, flood control, recreation, fishing and irrigation. It is now home to two large artificial reservoirs: the Kariba and Cahora Bassa (Osborne, 2003; Tilmant et al. 2012). Furthermore a number of at least 26 dams has been built for domestic, industrial, and mining water supply and for irrigation and power generation (Heyns, 2003). It's noteworthy to mention most of these irrigation and hydropower projects are being developed independently in the early stages of the projects (Tilmant et al., 2012).

Figure 1: the Zambezi River Basin

Source

Management of the Zambezi river basin

Like I have said before the Zambezi river is of vital importance of the region and is used through infrastructural projects like dams and irrigation systems. Obviously, this infrastructure affects the river in a great way. Especially the interferences upstream have a significant impact on the downstream regions. This demands a cooperation between the river’s riparian states to avoid conflict and achieve an equal share of the pie for all countries. The riparian states each monitor, asses, plan, develop, conserve and protect the water resources that are found in their territory of the Zambezi River. There is however little consultation or cooperation among the riparian states. Historically the Zambezi’s riparian states have not take the opportunity for joint water resources management, except in isolated cases (Osborne, 2000).

I start with the Zambezi River Action Plan (ZACPLAN) agreement signed in 1987 in Harare and strongly initiated and supported by the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP). The ZACPLAN was signed by the governments of Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. A move forward to a shared programme must be a good thing, I hear you think. However the ZACPLAN agreement was signed not primarily and foremost to prevent future conflict through judicious development of the Zambezi’s waters and a coordinated international water management, but for a political strategy to isolate South Africa. Thus, the riparian states seized the opportunity to eliminate South Africa’s opportunity to tap the Zambezi River in the future. Therefore, important issues concerning water management have not been considered or agreed upon (Kampanje-Phiri, 2016). The Southern Africa Development Coordinating Conference (SADCC), a mandate that included the promotion of power development and interconnection was signed in 1980 and would obtain the power to oversee the implementation of the ZACPLAN. The riparian states, however, did not want to give up their power to a third party. This shows the error in the programme, lacking a practical, executive basis having no real impact on the states’ approach to water resource management and development (Kampanje-Phiri, 2016).

In 1995, another protocol followed on shared watercourse systems and was signed by the Zambezi River Basin states. In 1997, the UN held a conference about the Law of Nonnavigational Uses of International Watercourses, the conference's key principles were to achieve reasonable and equitable utilisation and obligation not to cause significant harm. This conference influenced the revision of the 1995 protocol that was finally ratified in 2003 and embraced the conference’s international watercourse law (Kampanje-Phiri, 2016).

Besides the previous agreements and protocols that were signed and discussed in 1995 and 1997, there has been another initiative: the Zambezi Watercourse Commission (ZAMCOM) which would be a legal instrument to guide water resources development in the Zambezi River Basin. Zambia resigned the negotiations but the remaining 7 riparian states signed the ZAMCOM in 2004, adopting the generalised principles of the UN convention (Kampanje-Phiri, 2016).

Analysing the Zambezi’s water management agreements and protocols, we can see there has been a progress in signed agreements that should implement more cooperation and more regulation and management on the river overall. However one must be careful with this ‘success’. As Kampanje-Phiri (2016) argues, the Zambezi’s riparian states have signed the ZAMCOM in 2004 but this agreement overlooked specific instruments to address inherent issues in the Zambezi River Basin, this development endangers overlooking key issues that may be a key to promoting water cooperation in the basin.

Thus, it remains unclear whether the riparian states of the Zambezi are effective in managing their precious water resources that in the future will even be used more intensively than ever before. Whereas no real violent conflicts have occurred so far, without implementing a strong cooperative and integrated management system this might become reality in the future.

The Nubian Sandstone Aquifer: blessing or a curse?

In all the blogs I have written so far I have talked a lot about water in terms of surface water, in particular river flows and basins have been the water related topics of my blog. Nevertheless there are of course other water resources that people use. One of those resources is an aquifer. This blog will discuss, arguably one of the most important resources of water in North East-Africa: the Nubian Sandstone Aquifer System (NSAS). This blog will try to address the importance of the NSAS for the countries that can benefit from it. Furthermore it will exemplify the agreements the NSAS states have made as well as criticising these agreements.

Figure 1: a map of the NSAS

Source

The definition of an aquifer is rather complex but Mazor (2015) gives us a simple definition of the natural phenomenon. According to Mazor, an aquifer is: “a body of a permeable rock that contains water in all its pores and can sustain producing wells". Because this blog mainly focusses on the way the Nubian Sandstone Aquifer is managed by its riparian states and the importance of the aquifer for their population, a simple definition like Mazor’s is enough.

The NSAS is the world’s largest knows fossil aquifer and underlies the North-African countries of Chad, Egypt, Libya and Sudan (see figure 1) and is therefore home to approximately 136 million people in an area of 2,2 million square kilometres. As I have addressed before in my blog about the GERD, Egypt as well as the other NSAS countries have little water resources and are therefore highly dependent on the Nile river and the Nubian Sandstone Aquifer (NSA) to fulfil in their needs. In fact, the aquifer is vital to the survival of the Egyptians, Libyans, Sudanese and Chadians. Not to mention the populations that are supported by crops and livestock dependent on the aquifer’s water (IAEA; Bakhbakhi, 2006; Maxwell, 2011; Nijsten et al., 2018). One would understand why the aquifer is so valuable for the North African countries and why it’s disputed.

The amount of water that is extracted from the aquifer has increased rapidly in the past decades due to population growth, food demand and economic growth (Bakhbakhi, 2006). Mainly Egypt and Libya rely on the NSAS for agricultural as well as domestic water supply. The aquifer sounds like a gift from god to the thirsty and water scarce countries in the region, however there are some downsides to it. The NSAS is, in some places,  confined while in others it’s not. Besides, the quality of the water varies due to salinity differences. Therefore the aquifer should be regulated and exploited very carefully. Until 2013, the NSAS-countries had no binding multilateral treaty that  governed the usage of the NSAS whatsoever. This was very outstanding and rare in international water law (Maxwell, 2011; Nijsten et al., 2018; Daily Maverick, 2018).

The necessity of binding agreements

The NSAS region is politically very unpredictable. Under constant political instability water scarcity issues become even more important. To illustrate, the fighting in Darfur in 2011 and the independence of South Sudan was largely due to water access issues. Another example of a previous conflict in the NSAS region is about the Aouzou Strip in the border area of Chad and Libya. The Aouzou strip contains a part of the NSAS. Chad and Libya have spent years in an armed conflict about who could exercise sovereignty over the strip. A binding agreement of cooperation could acknowledge the culture of struggle the NSAS states face and start solving sovereignty problems the region faces (Maxwell, 2011).

Furthermore, Maxwell (2011) argues that the economic/wealth disparities between the NSAS states have the potential to influence the stability of the NSAS. Along with deep-seated political instability and the disadvantages in natural resources this demonstrates the high necessity of binding agreements between the NSAS states.

Agreements

Despite not having a binding multilateral treaty between the NSAS States, the states have been cooperating through agreements from 1992 until present day. The Joint Authority for the Study and Development agreement, dating back to 1992, was the first step in cooperation. This agreement, amongst later agreements between the NSAS riparian states, includes increased levels of engagement and intensified cooperation. The only instrument the Authority was able to record is an “internal regulation” which set out the internal structure, functions, decision-making and funding of the Authority. Therefore, the agreement carries no provisions regarding the management of the aquifer or groundwater stored in it (Nijsten et al., 2018).

Eight years later, in 2000, two agreements were made to advance the cooperation process among the NSAS countries. These agreements acknowledged and captured the need for regular monitoring, updating and sharing data and information about the NSAS to assure a sustainable use of the aquifer’s water resources. This need of sharing is recorded in the “Programme for the Development of a Regional Strategy for the Utilization of the NSAS”. An even more deepening process of cooperation was recorded in the “Regional Action Programme for the Integrated NSAS Management”. This project aims to develop a regional strategy for integrated NSAS Management and a sustainable long-term usage of the aquifer.

The latest agreement, dating back to 2013, is the so-called Strategic Action Plan (SAP). This agreement binds the NSAS states to take actions for sustainable aquifer management at a later stage and an equitable usage of it (Nijsten et al., 2018).

False hope?

The first binding agreement between the NSAS states might be a big step forward in managing the Nubian Sandstone Aquifer, after all agreements were signed, resulting in an increasing cooperation and equitable usage of the aquifer. However, the agreement is more like a vague aim rather than a well-established measure to keep the NSAS states in line. Therefore the agreements might not be ambitious and affective enough to prevent conflict from happening. Besides that, dependency on the NSAS is likely to increase as a consequence of population and economic growth and Egypt’s water conflict with Ethiopia concerning the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) (discussed in two of my former blogs).

Moreover, since water is such a valuable resource as well as very scarce in the NSAS region, and because the population of the NSAS is dependent on the aquifer to even be alive, the possibility that disputes arise is realistic. As I have argued in my first blog of the GERD, Egypt is prepared to go to war over its water resources. The NSAS is such a valuable resource, Egypt, Sudan, Libya and Chad are likely to get in a conflict with each other if access to it diminishes or restricts.

The deception of the Akosombo Dam, Ghana

I realise that I am getting more and more interested in large scale projects concerning water and especially river management. Since I have written about the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam in two of my former blogs, my knowledge and excitement about this topic is increasing. After attending a lecture about water management and discussing the Akosombo Dam in Ghana, I was eager to dive into this topic and its interesting political background and history. Therefore this week’s blog is about the Akosombo Dam. First I will give an impression of the Akosombo Dam with some facts and statistics about it. Subsequently I will focus on its history, as the dam is quite old. Finally I will try to put this case study in a broader perspective and give my comments and ideas about it in regards to politics.

The Akosombo Dam

The Akosombo Dam (Figure 1) – located in Akosombo, Ghana – is a so-called rockfill dam on the Volta river that was completed in 1965 as part of the Volta River Project. The specific name of the dam project is The Akosombo hydroelectric project (HEP) and is managed by the Volta River Authority (VRA). The dam is 134 meters high and has a crest of 671 meters. The dam was primarily built for the generation of hydropower which is mainly used by an aluminium smelting company at Tema known as the Volta Aluminium Company (VALCO). Furthermore it generates power for domestic, commercial and other industrial consumers. The dam contains 6 generating units with an installed capacity of 912 megawatts. The construction of the dam was jointly financed by the government of Ghana, the United States, the United Kingdom and the World Bank and the estimated cost of the project is around 258 million dollar. The construction of the dam resulted in the flooding of the Volta river, creating Lake Volta, one of the largest man-made lakes in the world. The lake was formed between 1962 and 1966 and caused approximately 80,000 people to resettle. Most of these relocated people were fishermen or subsistence farmers (Ghana Nation, 2011; Encyclopaedia Britannica; Gyau-Boakye, 2001).

The impoundment of the dam has been a success in several areas: the overall economic and industrial development of the country; transportation on Lake Volta; fishing, which has been profitable since the formation of the lake, intensification of farming along the 5500 km long shoreline; and a boom in tourism. On the other hand, the Akosombo Dam has had a negative impact on the environment and necessitated 80,000 people to resettle (Gyau-Boakye, 2001).

Figure 1: The Akosombo Dam

Source: Britannica.com

Cold War Battle Grounds

As this blog is not meant to be a cost-benefit analysis of the Volta River Project, I am not going to focus more on the positive and negative outcomes the project has had so far. Instead I want to emphasise the context and the reasons why and by whom the project was executed and 

payed for. It’s useful and important to address in what circumstances the project has taken place and who was in charge, so that we can understand how and why projects like this are being undertaken.

Although the Akosombo Dam was built in 1962, the idea of it is much older. British geologist Albert Ernest Kitson came up with it as early as 1915. In 1942, under the British Colonial Administration, the plans for the dam began to drawn up. After gaining independence – as the first African country to do so – elected Prime Minister of independent Ghana Dr. Kwame Nkrumah adopted the project the Brits had designed before. Kwame Nkrumah fully embraced modernist development ideas the ex-colonial powers had developed (Ghana Nation; Showers, 2011). Thus, the Volta River Project – what the Akosombo Dam is part of – lays in the centre of modernisation programs that would promise rapid industrialisation and electrification for the nation (Miescher & Tsikata 2009; Miescher, 2012). Ghana, and the rest of the continent were still dependent on the colonial powers. In order to gain economic independence. Ghana - along with other African countries - started with import substitution, which became the new element of development strategies. This strategy seemed to work quite well and Ghana’s economy was growing rapidly. Moreover living standards were improving as well. However, things changed by the late 1960’s and the economic development Ghana experienced had slowed down. Presumably this stagnation was due to ‘over-investment’ in the social sector and corruption (Baah, 2003).

What is largely ignored is the impact the cold war has had on the African continent after de-colonisation. Africa became one of the battlegrounds for the West and the Soviet-Union immediately after independence. Like Ghana, a lot of African countries were likely to choose the human-centred path of economic and social development  which had been very successful. The West saw this rapid, socialist orientated development as a threat to the free market ideology. This led to inference of the West in African political and economic affairs through respectively secret agencies and institutions. As mentioned before, the Akosombo Dam was built by investment of the World Bank, the US and the UK. The financing of the dam was the West’s attempt of political and economic influence in Ghana and in response to the Soviet-Union that constructed the Egyptian Aswan Dam. The objective of this strategy was not to help Ghana, or Africa in general, it was only a strategic interest of the West. The strategy was meant to undermine state participation and economic activities. Preventing for African countries to takeover the major economic activities (because they lacked entrepreneurship, skills and credit) and therefore pulling the states out of economic activities, the big Western multinationals could fill in these gaps and take over a lot of African economic activities (Baah, 2003).

Deception

Focusing on the context in which the dam is built is a useful way to reveal the politics behind the dam. In case of the Akosombo Dam, the main reason to build the dam was for modernisation and national unity/pride after becoming independent. It was a sign of a new beginning, future prosperity and nationalism. However it was also a colonial heritage and a cold war battle ground. Interests of the West and the Soviet-Union dominated national and international politics at that time. Whereas Ghana and the Ghanaians were pleased by the construction of the dam, it became a symbol of Western capitalism and the cold war that has played a major role in Africa’s post-colonial development. I guess the point I am trying to make is that water, although being omnipresent and so familiar, is a powerful tool to use in achieving your own goals and likes. The West used Ghana’s Volta river (so water) in order to satisfy Ghanaians by supplying them with electricity. However the only reason for the West to do so was to expand their capitalist ideology. The dam is a symbol for Africa’s failed economic development in the late 1960’s and their ‘invasion’ of Western multinationals that ultimately benefit the West more than the Africans. The electricity generated by the dam is mainly used by a massive aluminium smelter that’s owned by an American Company. In the end it feels like a deception: a massive dam built as a national trademark, generating power and economic development. But in the end it has been a game for the West, trying to influence Ghana with capitalist ideology. Using the electricity mainly for their own interest  and leaving behind a disrupted ecosystem and 80,000 displaced people. This case study taught me the power water can have over nations and international politics. Water can be a means of getting what you want.

Who owns the land and its water? The phenomenon of water grabbing.

In last week’s blog I discussed the impact of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam at the local level. I talked about different power relations between the government and the locals and the lack of collaboration between the government and the locals which resulted in problems for the local citizens of the GERD area. In this week’s blog I am going to talk about another political issue when it comes to water accessibility: land and water grabbing, a phenomenon very present in Africa.

The concept of land grabbing is a well-known one in the case of Africa but talking about water grabbing is new to me. To proceed with this blog I therefore must define this concept. According to Duvail et al.

'Water grabbing applies to cases where established user-rights and public interest are disregarded by powerful actors who are able to take control of water resources for their own benefit, depriving local communities whose livelihoods depend on these resources and ecosystems’ (Duvail et al, 2012 p. 323).

The asymmetrical power relations that are visible in the above definition is completely in line with the rest of my blogs. Addressing cases in which people lack power and resources to access safe water. It once again highlights the difficulties people face when it comes to water accessibility and unequal power relations that cause inaccessibility to clean water.

Although land grabbing is an international phenomenon, Africa is mostly affected by it. 47% of all land grabbing cases occur in the continent. African countries that are amongst the countries with the highest rates of grabbed land are the DRC, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, Cameroon and Mozambique. Countries that grab the most land are mainly located in the Middle-East, Southeast Asia, Europe and North America. These countries are all relatively wealthy but often struggle with sufficient water supply. The question is why is land grabbing happening? On an international level this is happening because of the rising food demand (partly caused by a growing population), dietary changes and the improvement and enlargement of biofuel production due to rising oil prices and recent changes in United States and European Union bioethanol policies. To meet these demands and changes, countries and companies acquire relatively cheap but productive agricultural land in different (African) countries (Rulli et al. 2012; Bues, A. and Theesfeld, I.2012; Rulli & D’Odorico, 2013). NGO’s are concerned that domestic farmers will be forced to leave the land they have farmed on for generations and will be replaced by foreign agribusinesses (Holmén, 2015).

Figure 1: map of global watergrabbing

Source

On the other hand, many African governments see this ‘land grab’ as a blessing. Since they lack the capacity and financial resources to invest in modernising their agricultural industry and infrastructure, they are happy with foreign businesses to do so for them. It almost seems irresistible not to accept this investment, since most African countries struggle with high poverty rates and a lack of financial capacity to boost the economy (Holmén, 2015).

The concept of land grabbing is unfortunately chosen. It implies illegal behaviour while in most cases it’s legal. Governments decide on the investments deal and therefore act like custodians. The government owns the land but can only lease the land to foreign businesses. Although the deals are largely legal, their legality needs qualifying. We could see land grabbing more like confiscation, this implies the process has both legal and government support and is therefore, to some extent, legitimate. This is the core of the land grabbing problem. African governments are still often contested by their citizens therefore the legal system is not accepted or applied everywhere. The government's influence to certain rural areas is still very limited. Land grabbing is therefore not only a battle between smallholders and foreign agricultural businesses, it’s also an ongoing battle between chiefs and states (Holmén, 2015).

The complexity of land and water grabbing makes it very hard to draw generalisations and conclusions about it. The phenomenon is prevalent in a lot of countries but strongly varies in terms of legality and process. Because African states still struggle with legality and ownership of land (and therefore the water connected to the land), it’s hard to label land grabbing as illegal. However, the consequences of this land grabbing are negative and threaten the livelihoods of many Africans. Local farmers have little to no power or voice in the deals governments make with foreign agricultural businesses. They have no legal rights when it comes to ownership of the land which makes them powerless in a legal point of view. The main point I want to make in this blog is that land grabbing is not as simple as is sounds, it has great legal challenges and involves asymmetrical power relations at the expense of smallholders. As long as local farmers have no legal rights when it comes to land ownership the land grabbing deals are legal and not to be seen as unfair and threatening for a big part of the African population. 

The question that arises to me after writing this blog is to what extent land grabbing is happening and affecting African smallholders in their livelihoods and water accessibility? Collected data is often unreliable and the impact of land deals varies in every single case. There seems to be no shared idea of the impact of land grabbing and the legality of this phenomenon amongst governments, agricultural businesses and scholars. Another question is whether international land grabbing is a bigger threat than land grabbing on a lower level (for example within states). Finally I want to emphasise the connection between land and water grabbing again. Land and water are interrelated and are not to be seen as two seperate entities. The confiscation of land automatically implies the water found on this land is confiscated as well. The water resources are always involved in the land grabbing as well. This makes land grabbing an important topic when it comes to water accesibility.

The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam: the 'losers'

Last week I discussed the hydro politics behind the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). This blog will be a sequel of my last blog. Whereas in the first blog about this topic I discussed the transnational power relations and political issues the riparian states of the Nile (in particular Egypt and Sudan) face with Ethiopia concerning the GERD, this week I will change the perspective of the GERDs impact from a transnational to a local level. My aim for these blogs is to try to get as many perspectives of different levels of interest groups in particular problems as possible. Therefore it’s important to see what actually happens in local context. Building the GERD might be beneficial for Ethiopia overall, but what happens to the people who live in the area where the dam is built?

When building a construction as big and impactful as the GERD there are some international organisations that guide the way in building constructions like this. The World Commission on Dams (WCD) prescribed seven commonly shared strategic priorities and integrated sustainability standards which are endorsed by the International Hydropower Association (IHA) to analyse the sustainability situation, opportunity and development of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). One of them, a particularly important one is ‘gaining public acceptance’. This priority emphasises that all interest groups should be informed about the project's affects and outcomes, these should not harm but safeguard their rights. Therefore all parties should be involved into the decision-making process. Finally, an importance is given to special attention for vulnerable people such as women, the poor and indigenous people (Chen, H. & Swain, A. 2014). The seven priorities set by the WCD seem to be reasonable and guiding when it comes to mediating between several interest groups and safeguarding the most beneficial outcomes for everyone. However this is not what’s happening in the case of the GERD. The building of the dam has not involved local residents in decision-making.

Figure 1: Explosion of dynamite to built the GERD

Local context

The GERD area is a sparsely populated one. The region is home to the indigenous people of Gumuz and Berta. They are one of the less developed groups of the country, even by Ethiopian standards. They know a huge project is happening but they have no idea how this may impact their life (International Rivers, 2012; Chen, H. & Swain, A. 2014; Veilleux, J.C., 2013). The impact of the GERD can be devastating: loss of livelihoods, unemployment and impoverishment are all likely to happen. The construction of the dam causes approximately 12,500 people to be displaced and start their lives elsewhere (International Rivers, 2012). According to the former director-general of the Ethiopian Environmental Protection Authority (EPA) displacement is not an issue. The displaced groups get money and land to resettle and an opportunity to work on the GERD project as well. This sounds like a generous and fair treatment for the affected groups. However we need to understand this is still an involuntarily displacement. The Gumuz and Berta strongly connect with the local land and water resources. It’s not easy for them to just switch to non-agricultural activities where they have to compete in the labour market while suffering from limited education (Chen, H. & Swain, A. 2014).

Massive projects like this include a lot of different interest groups to whom the outcomes of the project have great importance. With organisations like the WCD and the IHA, outlining strategies and frameworks, managing these kinds of projects should be doable in quite a smooth and inclusive way. Everybody who’s affected by the consequences of a dam should be involved in decision-making and planning. However this is not what has been done in the case of the GERD. The Ethiopian government has been focused on the greater good of the project rather including everybody such as the local people affected by it. Considering the Gumuz and the Berta are already a marginalised group with a relatively bad economic background it’s a shame they haven’t been taken into account in decision-making. The government is proud of the GERD and presents it as something that benefits all, however this in not the case for the local residents of the GERD area. Building a massive project like this might be easiest when you are building on the land of marginalised people with a worse economic background. They are less likely and capable in unifying themselves and protest against the state for building a big project. Ignoring them even with informing about the project seemed to be easier than taking their opinions and wellbeing into account with decision-making. This is reality for local level hydro-politics. A project like the GERD is important for entire governments and populations to argue about. While the people that are going to be affected by it the most have no voice.

Fighting for the Nile? (GERD part I)

In last week's blog I discussed the importance of politics when it comes to accessibility to (fresh) water. Looking at physical availability of water only, does not represent the actual availability and accessibility of water in Africa. Actors such as governments, NGO's and local officials all play a big role in the accessibility of water for African citizens. In today's blog I am going to have a look at one of Africa's biggest and most ambitious electricity projects in recent history: the construction of the Renaissance Dam in Ethiopia. And more important, what are the political consequences of this construction for relations between Ethiopia and Egypt and Sudan? 

Ethiopia started the construction of the Grand Renaissance Dam (see figure 1) in 2011 on the Blue Nile at the height of Guba, about 45 km from the Sudanese border (Tesfa, 2013). Ethiopia, after the Democratic Republic of Congo, has the highest theoretical hydropower capacity in Africa. However, only tiny amounts of this capacity have been used. Considering only 23% of Ethiopian households have access to electricity and 96% are still relying on traditional biomass, there is a need for more electricity (T.N. Kahsay et al., 2015). The Grand Renaissance Dam costs $ 4.8 billion and will have an installed capacity of 5250 megawatts. When the dam is finished, it will have a reservoir volume of more than 63 billion cubic meters, approximately 1.3 times the annual flow amount of the Blue Nile (Hammond, 2013; Veilleux, J., 2013; Chen, H. & Swain, A., 2014). 

   
 Figure 1: The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam under construction in 2017.

Ethiopia is struggling with shortage of water storage facilities, demands of institutional and infrastructural investment is high but the investment ability is low. A study of the Worldbank proves that the cost of hydrological variability has currently been estimated on more than one third of the country’s annual GDP. Therefore Ethiopia should really consider investing in multipurpose water infrastructure to ensure a sustainable long term solution for droughts and floods. Despite this need of a multipurpose water system, Ethiopia is only focusing on power generation instead of for example irrigation and water storage (Hammond, 2013; Chen, H., & Swain, A. 2014). 

 Fighting over Nile waters

The Nile river, on which the Grand Renaissance is built, is home to 11 African countries: Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda. Adjustments in the river automatically affect (mainly downstream) countries. Considering the Nile countries face increasing pressure on water resources due to population- and economic growth, tensions between Ethiopia and in particular Egypt and Sudan regarding the Grand Renaissance Dam, have increased (Hammond, 2013).

The Ethiopian highlands provide around 86% of the total Nile flow, 70% of that flow is coming from the Blue Nile (Hammond, 2013). Because the Nile river is so precious to North Eastern African countries, the water distribution of the river is laid out in the Nile agreement of 1959 between the riparian states of Egypt and Sudan. This agreement allocates 55.5 km3 to Egypt and 18.5 km3 to Sudan. Ethiopia (among other countries), however, has never acknowledged this agreement and argues that since most of the river flow originates in Ethiopia it has the right to have an equal and appropriate share of the river flow. Attempts on changing the 1959 agreement have failed in both 1999 and 2010. Egypt and Sudan showed great opposition and wished to keep their veto rights over upstream developments.

According to Ethiopia the agreement between Sudan and Egypt is only a bilateral one, excluding other riparian countries. Egypt needs the water and believes that it has the historical right of the Nile waters. This need for water is confirmed by Taylor (2017), arguing Egypt is in water stress according to the latest statistics. Egyptian former president Mohamed Morsi reportedly said in a television interview in 2013 he was not calling for a war with Ethiopia, but Egypt’s water security should not be ‘violated at all’. He warned Ethiopia by saying that if the Egyptian share of water was to diminished by one drop, ‘our blood is the alternative’ (CNN, 2018). This opposition reflects the change in geopolitical powers in the region. Egypt’s position as a hegemonic regional power due to a significant discrepancy between the socio-economic development with upstream states is decreasing. Ethiopia as a rising economic power and home to 86% of the Nile’s water supply will challenge Egypt’s power more and more (Hammond, 2013). 

Figure 2: Former Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi

In the past decades Ethiopia has failed to exploit their water potentials due to financial and political problems. Besides that, fellow riparian state Egypt has repeatedly succeeded in preventing international creditors and donors from investing in Ethiopian's Grand Renaissance Dam (Hammond, 2013; Veilleux, 2013; Chen, H., & Swain, A. 2014).

Thus, the construction of The Grand Renaissance Dam has caused great concerns in Egypt and Sudan. The Ethiopian government, however, argues that both countries will not be (significantly) harmed by the construction and operation of the dam. The government argues that Eastern Nile countries will even benefit from it. According to a research from Kahsay et al. (2015) Egypt will only be harmed by the dam if a sequence of dry years occur, that is because Egypt is more dependent on energy than water for it’s economic prosperity. Overall Kahsey et al (2015) argue that the building of the dam will boost the economy of Eastern African countries is therefore valuable for the riparian states.

As we have seen in this blog, water and constructions that change the flow of water are contested in a regional manner. Accessibility is not just a local affaire, it’s dependent on the actions of other (government) actors as well. As all riparian Nile countries are to some extent dependent on the Nile’s water, intervention on the river is a highly sensitive topic, just because it affects a basic need of life.

Bibliography

Chen, H., & Swain, A. (2014). The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam: Evaluating its sustainability standard and geopolitical significance. Energy Development Frontier, 3(1), 11.

Hammond, M. (2013, February). The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam and the Blue Nile: implications for transboundary water governance. In Global Water Forum (Vol. 1307).

Kahsay, T. N., Kuik, O., Brouwer, R., & van der Zaag, P. (2015). Estimation of the transboundary economic impacts of the Grand Ethiopia Renaissance Dam: A computable general equilibrium analysis. Water Resources and Economics, 10, 14-30.

Lazarus, S. (2018, October 21). Is Ethiopia taking control of the Nile river?. CNN. Retrieved from https://edition.cnn.com/2018/10/19/africa/ethiopia-new-dam-threatens-egypts-water/index.html

Tesfa, B. (2013). Benefit of grand Ethiopian renaissance dam project (GERDP) for Sudan and Egypt.

Veilleux, J. C. (2013). The human security dimensions of dam development: the grand Ethiopian renaissance dam. Global Dialogue, 15(2), 1-15.